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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of the quality of institutions on in-
flation. Using panel data from 1991 to 2007, we find that increase in institutional development 
which is measured by the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP has significant and si-
zeable effect on inflation. This paper finds that in countries with high inflation rates, financial 
sectors cannot resist current levels of inflation and banking system does not decrease inflation in 
the environment where private banks and financial companies have adapted to existing monetary 
environment. 
 
Keywords 
Inflation; Credit; Institutions; Quality 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic institutions, such as private property, rule of law, political stability and investment protection, play a 
vital role in promoting economic growth and development. While research shows that institutions are important 
determinant economic growth [1]-[3], there is evidence showing no link between institutions and economic 
growth [4]. A ubiquitous number of studies in the 1990’s have discovered a strong positive impact of institu-
tional development on macroeconomic stability, such as growth and low level of inflation [5]-[7]. 
Naturally, inflation has important implications for the society as it results in social and political complications 
of a serious nature [8]. Therefore understanding the drivers of inflation has always been in the center of interest 
to researchers, politicians and policymakers. Since the statement that “inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary factor”, cross-country determinants of inflation have been subject to economic attention [9]. These in-
clude openness [10], institutions [11] [12] and level of economic development [9].  
The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, we contribute to the empirical literature on the cross-country de-
terminants of inflation [9] [12]. We extend the literature by incorporating the measure of financial development/ 
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depth which is measured by domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP. A number of studies used this 
variable to assess the allocation of financial assets and were as a proxy of institutional development in cross- 
country studies [13] [14]. 
Second, we extend the discussion of [15] and [16] that “inflation is everywhere and always a monetary phe-
nomenon” with the hypothesis that size of that phenomenon is dependent on existing financial development of a 
country. 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis 
Inflation has always been in the center of interest to researchers, politicians and policymakers. According to 
classical economic theory there is a direct interrelation between the amount of money supply and the price level 
holding aggregate income and speed of transaction constant [17]. With the statement that “inflation is always 
and everywhere a monetary factor” economists are in general consensus regarding the factors that affect infla-
tion rate [9] [15]. A number of other studies recover the fact that inflation is purely monetary phenomena in a 
long run when structural policy challenges exist [15] [18] [19]. 
Kemal [18] examined the long run relationship and short-run dynamics between the money supply and infla-
tion rates. The study based on the quarterly data for a period of 1975-2003 showed that inflation is strongly as-
sociated with the short-run movements of money supply. According to results of the study money supply affects 
inflation in third quarter. A number of other studies focused on the impact of intuitional aspects like central bank 
independence, political stability on inflation [11] [12]. Using the system GMM estimator and data on economic, 
political and institutional variables from 1960 to 1999 for 160 economies [12] find that severe degrees of politi-
cal instability and low level of democracy and institutional development contribute to volatility of inflation rates. 
Additionally, central bank independence decreases inflation volatility [11]. Findings show existence of negative 
relation between central bank independence and inflation in Western countries. However, in former socialist 
economies central bank independence contributes to the reduction on inflation only above determined threshold 
of achieved level of liberalization. A feasible argument for that conclusion is that in command economy, the 
freedom is significantly limited; hence law abidance, including in particular Central Bank laws, is not as impor-
tant. Gelos and Ustyugova [20] provide assessment of the impact of international commodity price shocks on 
domestic inflation in 31 advanced and 61 emerging economies. According to their results better overall gover-
nance, central bank independence helps to anchor inflation expectations and reduce aftereffects of price shocks.  
However, a study by [9] concludes that there is little evidence that institutional development (central bank in-
dependence) favors low inflation. Their results are in line with [21]. He argues that in countries with high infla-
tion rates financial sectors cannot resist current levels of inflation and central bank independence does not de-
crease inflation in the environment where banking system and financial companies have adapted to existing 
monetary environment. Hyperinflation impairs financial system and destroys financial intermediation [22].  
Based on the previous theoretical background we derive the following hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 1. Increase in the quality of institutional development is associated with decrease in inflation rates. 
Hypothesis 2. Institutional development does not decrease decrease inflation in countries experiencing high 
inflation rates. 
3. Data and Methodology 
The key methodological challenge in our approach is to use a good measure of quality of institutional develop-
ment. Economic literature does not offer one precise definition of economic, social and political institutions and 
means of institutional impact on economic activity [23]. According to [2] institutions are a class of rules, com-
pliance procedures and moral and ethical behavioral norms intended to constrain the behavioral of individuals in 
the interest of maximizing the wealth or utility of the principals. To measure quality of institutions existing stu-
dies has focused on a set of variables and indices such as the enforcement of property rights, level of corruption, 
global competitiveness index, governance indicators and others. Economists frequently rely on a number of in-
dicators collectively to account for various channels of institutional impact on economic outcomes. Samimi [24] 
explored the effect of economic freedom on inflation rate for 17 Middle East and North African countries 
(MENA). As a proxy for “economic freedom” the study used index computed by Heritage Foundation. The in-
dex of Heritage Foundation is a mean of ten sub-indexes which focuses on monetary freedom, trading freedom, 
fiscal freedom, investment freedom, property rights and etc. A number of studies used Worldwide Governance 
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Indicators (WGI) as a measure of governance and institutional development [20] [25]. Provided by [26] WGI 
covers 215 countries in following dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. These indicators range from −2.5 to +2.5 
where higher value indicates better governance.  
However, [23] argues that this leads to substantial errors in research for developing countries and diminishes 
the interpretation of the place of institutional development in economic outcomes. Most of the institutional va-
riables integrated into economic models are based on the survey responses or measured as indices. The interpre-
tation of economic content of such variables in empirical results is rather limited and subjective [27].  
In this paper as a measure of institutional development we use domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP 
which measures quality and the quantity of the banking system [28] [29]. Jonas and Mishkin [30] report that in 
transition economies the government is directly involved in the central bank’s monetary policy limiting the in-
dependence of banking system and personalizing conducted monetary policy. All these facts favor in choice of 
this variable.  
Our preferred methodology is based on [10] and can be summarized as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , , ,ln 1 2 ln 3 ln 4 ln t it i t i t i t iinf gdppc open dcredβ β β β ε= + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ +  
where inf stands for GDP deflator (annual), gdppc—GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), 
open—imports as a share of GDP, and dcred—domestic credit to private sector as a % of GDP, ε—is a normally 
distributed random error capturing unobserved effects on inflation. Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. 
4. Results 
We use panel data to test the prediction that inflation is higher in the countries with underdeveloped banking 
sector. Our sample covers all the available countries for period of 1991-2007. Table 2 contains the results ob-
tained from OLS estimation. We perform a Hausman test to choose between a fixed and random effects specifi-
cation. Based on the test results, we have chosen a fixed effect rather than a random effects model.  
All of the coefficients have the expected signs, and statistically significant. We find that institutional charac-
teristics of a monetary policy (quality of banking system and the level of financial development) are important 
determinant of inflation in developing countries. Our results are consistent with the findings of [31] [32]. These 
studies demonstrate that growth in domestic credit to private sector is inversely related to inflation. 
In order to test hypothesis 2 we investigate the results for a variety of sub-samples (Table 3). Column 1 ex-
cludes all the countries with annual inflation above 50%. Exclusion of the countries with high inflation shows 
that well banking system plays important role in reducing inflation. Column 2 and 3 excludes observations with 
average inflation rates less than 50% and 100% from the sample. Results show that dcred coefficient has ex-
pected sign but is not statistically significant.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examined impact of quality of institutions on inflation in cross-country estimations. Using panel data 
from 1991 to 2007, our paper finds that increase in the quality of institutions, which is measured by the ratio of 
domestic credit to private sector to GDP has significant and sizeable effect on inflation. Using alternative meas-
ure of institutional development of banking sector, we achieved results which are consistent with the findings of 
other papers [12]. Consequently, institutions play a role in reducing inflation and the estimated relations are robust 
overall. We clearly demonstrate that level of institutional development of banking system is an important deter-
minant of anti-inflation policy in developing countries. The estimated results can be used by policymakers of  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics.                                          
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
ln(inf) 1.89 1.47 −5.50 10.19 
ln(gdppc) 8.53 1.28 4.62 11.21 
ln(open) 3.68 0.59 −2.08 5.31 
ln(dcred) 3.36 1.07 −1.68 8.63 
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Table 2. Dependent variable: logarithm of average annual GDP deflator 
(1991-2007).                                                       
 (1) 
GDP per capita −1.26*** 
 (0.14) 
Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP −0.14*** 
 (0.05) 
Openness −0.19 
 (0.12) 
N 2525 
adj. R2 0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
 
Table 3. Dependent variable: logarithm of average annual GDP deflator (1991-2007).                                 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita −0.78*** 1.37* 1.04 
 (0.13) (0.77) (0.98) 
Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP −0.10
** 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
−0.11 
(0.26) 
Openness 0.10 0.26 0.55 
 (0.11) (0.50) (0.69) 
Restrictions Inflation below 50% Inflation above 50% Inflation above 100% 
N 2377 148 80 
adj. R2 0.10 0.02 0.05 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
transition countries such as CIS countries where inflation is an important factor of macroeconomic instability 
and domestic credit to private sector is much lower than the world averages. By enhancing monetary freedom 
and reforming banking system, these economies can create feasible tool conducive to long-run inflations stabili-
ty. Our results reveal that in countries experience, hyperinflationary financial sectors cannot resist current levels 
of inflation and banking system does not decrease inflation in the environment where private banks and financial 
companies have adapted to existing monetary environment. 
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